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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from 
magic.”1 As technology and science advance with increasing speed 
and scope, courts are tasked with increasingly difficult 
determinations on admissibility of evidence.2 Using in-court experts 
to explain scientific methods has become necessary; however, this 
necessity carries the risk of tainting judges and juries with unreliable 
“junk science.”3 This problem demands a standard to balance the 
need for expert testimony against the corresponding risk of 
deception. 
Over ninety years ago, in Frye v. United States,4 this demand was 
recognized. The court stated that “[s]omewhere in this twilight zone 
the evidential force of the principal must be recognized.”5 The Frye 
court held that novel scientific evidence must be “generally 
accepted” in its particular field to be admissible.6 Seventy years later, 
the United States Supreme Court rejected Frye as the appropriate test 
for federal courts and established the Daubert standard.7 This factor-
based standard directs judges, as gatekeepers, to determine the 
reliability and relevance of the testimony.8 
Minnesota courts presently stand in opposition to the majority 
of states, which have adopted the Daubert standard.9 Minnesota 
1. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LIMITS OF 
THE POSSIBLE 34 (1961). 
2. See generally Carl H. Hanson, When Science Is Too Daunting: Multiple Chemical
Sensitivity, Federal Courts, and the Struggling Spirit of Daubert, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 273
(2000) (discussing use of science in the courtroom and the troubles in applying 
novel scientific evidence in Frye and Daubert hearings). 
3. See generally Joseph M. Price & Gretchen Gates Kelly, Junk Science in the
Courtroom: Causes, Effects, and Controls, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 395 (1996) (explaining 
the evolution of and current problem with junk science expert testimony). 
4. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5. Id. at 1014.
6. Id.
7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).
8. See id. at 597 (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the
judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from 
learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance 
that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic 
understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.”). 
9. See Heather G. Hamilton, Note, The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where
Do the States Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 208–10 (1998) (discussing the aftermath 
effect of Daubert in state courts). 
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instead adheres to its own Frye-Mack test.10 However, amid continuing 
controversy and partisan lobbying, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence is currently soliciting 
input on whether to amend or abandon the Frye-Mack standard.11  
Part II of this Note examines the history of the Frye and Daubert 
standards, focusing on the evolution of Minnesota’s Frye-Mack 
standard.12 Part III analyzes Minnesota’s Frye-Mack standard and 
identifies areas in which Frye-Mack has been inconsistently applied.13 
In Part IV, this Note considers possible changes to Frye-Mack.14 Part 
V concludes that Minnesota courts would benefit from changes to 
Frye-Mack that clarify its application while retaining its uniform and 
deferential qualities.15 
II. HISTORY
A. Where It All Started: Frye v. United States 
In 1923, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed a trial court’s exclusion of polygraph evidence in a murder 
trial.16 Finding the polygraph test insufficiently reliable, the court 
crafted a “general acceptance” test to scrutinize the unrecognized 
scientific methods.17 The test requires that “the thing from which the 
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”18 
10. See, e.g., Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000) (rejecting
Daubert and reaffirming adherence to the Frye-Mack standard). 
11. Mike Mosedale, Is Frye-Mack Toast? Committee Mulls Shift to Daubert
Standard, MINN. LAW. (July 21, 2016), http://minnlawyer.com/2016/07/21/is-frye 
-mack-toast-committee-mulls-shift-to-daubert-standard/. 
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). This case turned
on admissibility of the then-novel systolic blood pressure deception test, a 
predecessor to the polygraph test. For a more in-depth explanation of Frye and 
polygraph testing, see Vincent V. Vigluicci, Calculating Credibility: State v. Sharma 
and the Future of Polygraph Admissibility in Ohio and Beyond, 42 AKRON L. REV. 319, 321–
22 (2009). 
17. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
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 Frye’s general acceptance test was initially unremarkable. Only 
a few dozen published cases cited Frye from 1923 until the 1960s.19 
Frye’s slow recognition is partially explained by the lack of novel 
forensic breakthroughs during this period.20 Moreover, expert 
scientific evidence during this time was not commonly used in civil 
court proceedings.21 Its usage notwithstanding, the Frye general 
acceptance standard controlled the admissibility of novel scientific 
evidence for seventy years.22 
In 1975, largely in response to the “federalization” of criminal 
law,23 the Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated.24 Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 (FRE 702) applied to expert testimony 
previously subject to the Frye standard.25 While FRE 702 made no 
mention of Frye, this silence was not an express rejection of Frye.26 
19. See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the
General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 388 (2001). 
20. Id. at 388–89.
21. Id. at 389. Courts did not apply Frye to a civil case until 1988 in a toxic tort
case. Id. at 391. Before 1988, Frye was applied in forensic science applications in 
criminal trials. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye 
v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205–06 (1980).
22. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993) (“In the
70 years since its formation in the Frye case, the ‘general acceptance’ test has been 
the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence 
at trial.”). However, beginning in the 1950s, the general acceptance standard 
became controversial. Chief among critics was Professor Charles McCormick. 
McCormick criticized Frye for not properly deciding issues of scientific fact and 
instead advocated for a more lenient “relevancy” approach. See Bernstein, supra note 
19, at 389 (discussing McCormick’s “relevancy” theory as a replacement for Frye). 
23. Bernstein, supra note 19, at 390.
24. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. The Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, appointed by Chief Justice Earl 
Warren in 1965, worked for more than ten years to draft the rules before the rules 
were signed into law. Id.; see also Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2003 (1994) (describing the development 
and enactment of the federal rules). 
25. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as originally promulgated, read: “If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise.” 88 Stat. at 1937. 
26. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules
of Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on 
the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence.”). 
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During this period, the Frye test was applied more frequently and 
with less uniformity.27 
Because Frye still existed and differed from FRE 702’s 
requirements, courts began to inconsistently apply the two standards 
to scientific evidence.28 Some courts remained faithful to Frye, others 
applied FRE 702, some applied a merged version of the two, and still 
others applied a “relevancy” standard.29 
In the mid-1980s, Frye was shaken by an increase in toxic tort 
litigation.30 An influx of causation-focused civil cases that hinged on 
the admissibility of expert witnesses triggered questions of Frye’s 
applicability.31 In response to this problem and in addition to the 
increase in novel scientific and technological methods, 
disagreement on standards arose between and among federal and 
state courts.32 
B. Where It All Changed: The Daubert Trilogy 
The dispute between and among courts about the appropriate 
standard for expert testimony prompted the United States Supreme 
Court to step in.33 In the 1990s, the Court decided three causation-
27. See Giannelli, supra note 24, at 2004 (discussing the inconsistency with
which courts admitted evidence of voiceprint identifications, bite mark 
comparisons, and hypnotically-refreshed testimony). Compare United States v. 
Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rejecting voiceprint evidence for lack of 
general acceptance under Frye), with United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 
1975) (admitting voiceprint evidence and rejecting Frye’s applicability). 
28. Bernstein, supra note 19, at 389–90.
29. Id. at 390.
30. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. 
L. REV. 643, 661, 669 (1992) (describing how the “Agent Orange” product liability 
litigation expanded the scope of Frye’s concerns by acknowledging Frye’s relevance 
to prove causation in tort injury cases). 
31. See generally David Bernstein, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The
Expert Witness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 117 (1990) (discussing 
the problems with admissibility of expert testimony in the face of an increase in 
toxic tort litigation). 
32. See Giannelli, supra note 24, at 2009–15 (discussing the various standards
for admissibility used by courts in the 1970s and 1980s and noting disagreement 
between standards). 
33. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993) (“In this
case we are called upon to determine the standard for admitting expert scientific 
testimony in a federal trial.”). 
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based tort cases that together permanently changed the landscape 
of scientific expert testimony.34 
In the 1993 case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,35 
the United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict 
between Frye and FRE 702. The Court abandoned the Frye test, 
holding that general acceptance is not required to admit scientific 
evidence.36 The Court reasoned that FRE 702’s silence as to Frye was 
grounds for rejecting the standard.37 The Court relied on the 
language of the Federal Rules to craft a new test.38 The new “Daubert 
standard” envisioned judges acting as gatekeepers in charge of 
deciding admissibility of expert testimony based on principles of 
reliability.39 To determine reliability, the Daubert standard directs 
trial courts to consider non-exclusive and non-dispositive factors 
including whether the theory or technique (1) can be tested, (2) has 
been subjected to peer review or publication, (3) has a known or 
potential rate of error, (4) has existing and maintained standards 
controlling the technique’s operation, and (5) is generally accepted 
within the relevant scientific community.40 
In 1997, General Electric Co. v. Joiner reaffirmed and extended a 
trial court’s broad discretion under Daubert by deeming “abuse of 
discretion” the appropriate standard of review for admitting 
scientific testimony.41 Joiner also allows courts to examine the 
reliability of an expert’s reasoning process, not just the theory’s 
general methodology.42 Two years later, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 
extended the Daubert standard to all expert testimony, not just 
34. See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 206–10 (1998) (discussing the evolution from
Frye to Daubert and the effect upon state courts after Daubert was decided). 
35. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
36. Id. at 597.
37. Id. at 588–89.
38. Id. at 591–92.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 593–94. Notably, Frye’s general acceptance standard is incorporated
as a relevant factor in a Daubert analysis but, in contrast to Frye, is not a dispositive 
factor. Id. 
41. 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
42. See id. (“[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another. . . . A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion proffered.” (citation omitted)). 
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scientific testimony.43 Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire together 
comprise the Daubert trilogy.44 
Trial lawyers and judges reacted strongly to Daubert. Civil 
plaintiff-side attorneys and criminal prosecutors—two sides 
commonly seeking to admit expert testimony—expressed disdain for 
Daubert.45 While Daubert was intended to further the “liberal thrust” 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence,46 opponents forecasted that 
Daubert’s discretionary and factor-based makeup was likely to cause 
increased scrutiny of experts, inconsistent rulings, and an increase 
in time and money47 spent fighting over the admissibility of expert 
testimony.48 In contrast, those who supported Daubert found that 
abandoning Frye was necessary to allow judges to apply a more 
43. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
44. See David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States,
44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 351–57 (2004) (discussing the Daubert trilogy’s development 
and impact on Frye). 
45. See Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law’s
Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 913, 923–24 (1994) (noting that prosecutors and plaintiffs’ 
attorneys—each representing real victims—support Frye because of their reliance 
upon complete deference to the scientific community to decide admissibility of 
controversial scientific methods). But see Paul M. Barrett, Justices Rule Against Business 
in Evidence Case—Restrictive Standard for Use of Scientific Testimony in Trials Is Struck 
Down, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1993, at A3 (describing Frye as a test widely used to 
exclude scientific evidence from personal-injury and other trials). 
46. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (quoting
Beach Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). 
47. In 2016, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon vetoed Senate Bill 591, which sought
to require that Missouri adopt Daubert. Hanna Nakano, Legal Experts Differ on Mo. 
Governor’s Daubert Veto; Business Leader Says It Leaves Negative Mark on State, MADISON-
ST. CLAIR REC. (July 14, 2016, 6:36 AM), http://madisonrecord.com/stories 
/510958596-legal-experts-differ-on-mo-governor-s-daubert-veto-business-leader-says 
-it-leaves-negative-mark-on-state. Nixon argued in his veto that Daubert was a 
“complicated and costly procedure” that for victims would have “ma[de] it more 
expensive—and perhaps cost prohibitive—to bring forward their claims.” Id. 
48. Interview with Michael Weiner, Senior Partner, Yaeger & Weiner, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 30, 2016) [hereinafter Weiner]. Product liability attorney 
Michael Weiner outlined these perceived problems with Daubert. Id. Mr. Weiner 
asserts that because the general acceptance test is more predictable and less 
commonly at issue, a switch to Daubert opens the door for defense attorneys to fight 
for exclusion of generally accepted expert testimony and for judges to weave 
personal opinions or political views into determinations. Id. Mr. Weiner also stated 
that Frye-Mack hearings, commonly held as pretrial motions in limine, are expensive 
to argue and more difficult to prepare for if general acceptance is merely one factor 
that a Daubert judge may consider. Id. 
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flexible and comprehensive standard to ever-evolving scientific 
advances while adhering to the updated Federal Rules of Evidence.49 
Several studies dulled the sharp predictions made by Daubert 
opponents. One study found no statistically significant difference in 
the rates at which cases were removed to federal court between states 
applying Daubert and those applying Frye.50 Another study found 
“very little evidence that adoption of the Daubert trilogy ha[d] any 
systematic effect on whom is offered as an expert in state court 
disputes.”51 A third study found Daubert to have no impact on 
admission rates of expert testimony in criminal cases at either the 
trial or appellate court levels.52 
Other studies have shown that Daubert had a more notable 
effect. One study of Daubert found that civil defendants succeed in 
excluding nearly two-thirds of plaintiffs’ proffered expert 
testimony.53 Another study found an early increase in the frequency 
with which challenged evidence is excluded54 and a corresponding 
rise in the number of cases dismissed at the summary judgment 
stage.55 This study posited that judges applying Daubert initially 
applied increased scrutiny while executing their new gatekeeping 
49. See generally Lorie S. Gildea, Sifting the Dross: Expert Witness Testimony in
Minnesota After the Daubert Trilogy, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 93, 105–10 (2000)
(arguing that Minnesota should abandon Frye-Mack in favor of Daubert). 
50. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 511 (2005). 
51. Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Does Anyone Get Stopped at the Gate? An
Empirical Assessment of the Daubert Trilogy in the States, 20 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 33 
(2012). 
52. Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 364 
(2002). 
53. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 108 (2000). 
54. Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Evidence in
Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 251, 293 
(2002) (finding that the percentage of challenged evidence excluded increased 
from 55% between July 1991 and June 1993 to 71% between July 1996 and June 
1997). 
55. Id. at 296 (finding an increase in the frequency with which summary
judgment was granted when evidence was challenged from 21% between July 1989 
and June 1993 to 48% between July 1995 and June 1997). Unlike the exclusion rates, 
the rates of summary judgment grants were not found to have subsided by the late 
1990s. Id. at 294. This change could be due to broader litigation trends, but Daubert 
likely played a role in this occurrence. See id. at 295–96. 
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duties56 but also found that the evidence exclusion rates receded 
back to pre-Daubert levels by 1999.57 
The increased scrutiny that initially occurred after Daubert may 
tell a more relevant story than the nominal net effect on exclusion 
rates. In examining the changes to attorney practices in federal civil 
cases post-Daubert, one study found that Daubert “appears to have 
encouraged [federal judges and attorneys] to take a more active role 
in scrutinizing proffered testimony.”58 For example, post-Daubert, 
attorneys were more likely to have retained experts, scrutinized 
expert credentials, and become more involved in testimony 
preparation.59 Correspondingly, more motions in limine to exclude 
experts were filed post-Daubert, and, if exclusion was granted, 
summary judgment motions often followed.60 These findings 
support the conclusion that Daubert courts apply a stricter scrutiny to 
proffered expert testimony, which is precisely the argument against 
Daubert made by lawyers seeking to retain the objectivity inherent in 
Frye.61 
In the first four years after Daubert, thirty-three states adopted 
Daubert or a comparable standard.62 Additionally, Daubert prompted 
all states to acknowledge that novel scientific testimony was subject 
to a Frye or Daubert test in civil cases, not just criminal cases.63 As of 
2001, the relevant standards used by states broke down 
approximately as follows: twenty-nine states applied Daubert or a 
similar test; six states applied the Daubert factors but did not reject 
Frye; sixteen states and the District of Columbia adhered to Frye or a 
similar test; and four states followed other standards.64 Since 2001, 
56. Id. at 298.
57. Id. at 293.
58. Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 330 
(2002). 
59. See id. at 329.
60. Id.
61. Weiner, supra note 48.
62. Hamilton, supra note 9, at 209.
63. Bernstein, supra note 19, at 394–95 (“After Daubert, no state has explicitly
held that Frye is not applicable to evidence in products liability and toxic tort 
cases.”). 
64. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of
Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2001). 
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several other states have accepted Daubert or a similar test, limiting 
Frye adherents to a slim minority.65 
C. Minnesota’s Standard 
1. Pre-Goeb
Minnesota originally applied Frye to scientific expert 
testimony.66 In 1977, Minnesota adopted its own rules of evidence.67 
Minnesota’s rules were modeled after the Federal Rules and 
included an identical version of FRE 702.68 Minnesota Rule of 
Evidence 702 (MRE 702) did not mention Frye or its general 
acceptance test; its focus was on ensuring witness qualification and 
assisting triers of fact in formulating correct resolutions.69 
Three years after the Minnesota Rules were codified, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court decided State v. Mack.70 In Mack, the court 
excluded testimony based on hypnotically refreshed recollection 
testimony under Frye but added a layer to the Frye standard by 
requiring that the proffered expert testimony “meet ordinary 
standards of reliability for admission.”71 Thus, Minnesota’s test 
became two-pronged: first, novel scientific evidence must be 
65. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 702; FLA. R. EVID. 90.702; MISS. R. EVID. 702; Motorola,
Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 752 (D.C. 2016) (overturning Frye over ninety years 
after deciding it). 
66. See State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 220–21, 52 N.W.2d 458, 465 (1952).
67. Order Promulgating the Rules of Evidence (Minn. Apr. 1, 1977),
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/AdministrativeFileArchive/Rules
%20of%20Evidence%20ADM10-8047%20(formerly%20C3-84-2138)/1977-04-01     
-Order-Amending-Rls-of-Evid.pdf. The Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory 
Committee, which consisted of a variety of state judges and practitioners, drafted 
and proposed the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Id. The preliminary comments to 
these Rules stated, “Unless there was a substantial state policy which required 
deviation from the federal rule, the committee recommended the federal rule of 
evidence exactly as enacted.” Preliminary Comment, Order Promulgating Rules of 




68. Penelope Harley, Minnesota Decides: Goeb v. Tharaldson and the Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 460, 492 (2001). 
69. MINN. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s comment to 1977 Order
Promulgating the Rules of Evidence. 
70. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
71. Id. at 772.
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generally accepted in its relevant scientific community,72 and 
second, the evidence must have foundational reliability.73 
In the first years after Daubert was decided, the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals heard a number of cases that required choosing between 
Daubert and Frye.74 However, because the Minnesota Supreme Court 
possessed the sole authority to amend the rules of evidence and had 
reaffirmed Frye as recently as 1989,75 the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
declined to apply Daubert in these cases.76 Into the late 1990s, 
Minnesota courts remained largely faithful to Frye-Mack without any 
express rejection of Daubert.77 
2. The Goeb Decision
In 2000, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether to 
abandon Frye in favor of Daubert.78 The case, Goeb v. Tharaldson, was a 
toxic tort battle hinging on causation, much like Daubert.79 After 
becoming ill from an insecticide, the plaintiffs filed suit against the 
insecticide’s manufacturer and applier.80 At trial, the plaintiffs 
sought to introduce expert testimony to substantiate their causation 
argument.81 The district court granted the defendants’ motion to 
72. See State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 97–98 (Minn. 1990).
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., K.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., 538 N.W.2d 152, 157
n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(noting that Daubert’s persuasive force in Minnesota may be strengthened by the 
fact that Minnesota Rules of Evidence are modeled after the federal rules); State v. 
Goldstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 342 n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
75. See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1989) (citing Frye-Mack’s
more objective and uniform rulings as justification for adhering to the standard). 
76. See Alt, 504 N.W.2d at 46 (“It is for our supreme court, not this court, to
decide Daubert’s impact in Minnesota.”). 
77. See, e.g., Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 812 (Minn. 2000) (noting
that Minnesota courts have, to date, refused to abandon Frye-Mack); State v. 
Hodgson, 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. 1994) (acknowledging Daubert’s repudiation of 
Frye in the federal sphere but refusing to address Daubert’s relevance in Minnesota 
law). But see Fairview Hosp. & Health Care Servs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
535 N.W.2d 337, 340 n.4 (Minn. 1995) (implying that Daubert was applicable in the 
court’s analysis of expert testimony); State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 161–64 (Minn. 
1994) (applying a Daubert-style reliability test to determine admissibility of DNA 
evidence). 
78. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 809.
79. Id. at 803–05.
80. Id. at 805.
81. Id.
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exclude the expert testimony because, under Frye-Mack, the expert’s 
methodologies were neither generally accepted nor reliable.82 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis in Goeb acknowledged 
Frye-Mack’s criticisms. First, the court stated that the general 
acceptance standard may wrongly “exclude cutting-edge but 
otherwise demonstrably reliable, probative evidence.”83 Second, the 
court recognized that Frye-Mack “improperly defers to scientists the 
legal question of admissibility of scientific evidence.”84 Third, the 
court noted that Frye-Mack fails to define the “relevant scientific 
community” and fails to define or quantify general acceptance.85 
Finally, the court conceded that adhering to Frye-Mack prevents 
uniformity with the Federal Rules of Evidence.86 
Nonetheless, the Goeb court combatted these criticisms and 
reaffirmed Frye-Mack.87 The court first noted that no significant 
advancements in Minnesota case law or Rules of Evidence suggest 
any problem with Frye-Mack sufficient to justify a change.88 Next, the 
court expressed concern that Daubert, by allowing judges substantial 
discretion, would lead to inconsistent district court rulings only 
correctable if abuse of discretion is proven.89 The court believed that 
this discretion to decide disputes between qualified scientists on 
complex scientific issues was beyond the proper scope of judicial 
authority or capability.90 Ultimately, seeking objective and uniform 
rulings and seeing little problem with Minnesota’s status quo, the 
court in Goeb rejected Daubert and reaffirmed adherence to Frye-
Mack.91 
82. Id. at 808–09.
83. Id. at 812.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 813.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 814.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 813.
91. Id. at 814.
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3. Post-Goeb
Many of the initial cases following Goeb worked to determine 
thresholds for general acceptance92 and foundational reliability.93 
This struggle was not new; the same struggles were aptly articulated 
over eighty years prior when the Frye Court observed, “Just when a 
scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. 
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle 
must be recognized . . . .”94 
Additionally, Minnesota courts worked to determine which 
types of scientific evidence remained “novel” and which standard was 
appropriate for “non-novel” evidence. For example, in State v. 
MacLennan,95 the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed whether to 
apply Frye-Mack to social science evidence about battered child 
syndrome.96 The court distinguished social science evidence, which 
explains an individual’s behavior, from physical science evidence, 
which instead involves a test or diagnosis.97 This distinction led the 
court to apply a standard MRE 702 analysis instead of Frye-Mack.98 
In 2006, the Minnesota Supreme Court amended MRE 702 to 
codify Goeb.99 The language of MRE 702 made the Mack foundational 
reliability prong applicable to all expert testimony but limited the 
Frye general acceptance prong to “opinion or evidence involv[ing] 
novel scientific theory.”100 In doing so, the court intentionally 
declined to define what constituted reliable foundation, novel 
92. Compare State v. Traylor, 656 N.W.2d 885, 893 (Minn. 2003) (deeming the
PCR-STR method of testing DNA to clearly be generally accepted and reasoning 
that decisions of other jurisdictions are relevant to a Frye-Mack analysis), with State 
v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 821–23 (Minn. 2002) (holding that the PCR-STR
method is not generally accepted simply because other courts have ruled it so and 
is thus considered a novel scientific technique subject to a Frye-Mack test). 
93. Compare State v. Bailey, 677 N.W.2d 380, 399–400 (Minn. 2004) (holding
insufficient the trial court’s conclusion that DNA results were foundationally 
reliable based on the DNA Advisory Board standards), with Traylor, 656 N.W.2d at 
897 (holding that the DNA Advisory Board standards are appropriate for judging 
foundational reliability of DNA testing). 
94. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
95. 702 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 2005).
96. Id. at 230–33.
97. Id. at 232–33.
98. Id. at 233.
99. See MINN. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment.
100. MINN. R. EVID. 702. 
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scientific evidence, or general acceptance.101 Courts acknowledged 
this rule change and ignored the general acceptance prong when 
the technique producing the evidence was no longer considered 
novel.102 In 2007, the court clarified that novel scientific evidence 
under MRE 702 applies only to “evidence based on emerging 
scientific techniques.”103 
In 2011, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Obeta,104 
outlined a version of Minnesota’s then-current standard for 
admitting expert testimony: (1) the witness must be qualified as an 
expert, (2) the expert’s opinion must have foundational reliability, 
(3) the expert testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact, and (4) 
the testimony must satisfy the Frye-Mack test if it involves a novel 
scientific theory.105 Prong four, as articulated by Goeb, is itself two-
pronged. Prong four requires that the proponent of expert 
testimony premised on a novel scientific technique establish that, 
first, the theory or technique is generally accepted in the relevant 
scientific field, and, second, “the test itself is reliable and that its 
administration in the particular instance conformed to the 
procedure necessary to ensure reliability.”106 
Obeta’s standard caused confusion by discussing foundational 
reliability in parts two and four of the test.107 In 2012, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court attempted to clarify this discrepancy in Doe v. 
Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis.108 In Doe, the plaintiff argued 
that the district court erred by applying the Frye-Mack foundational 
reliability test to evidence of repressed memory instead of a general 
 101. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000) (“Further, 
because the law is continuously evolving, answers to these questions will be set forth 
in case law as the issues properly present themselves.”); see also MINN. R. EVID. 702 
advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment. 
 102. See, e.g., State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 103–04 (Minn. 2010); State v. Roman 
Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 2002). 
 103. Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 528 (Minn. 2007) 
(quoting State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 419 (Minn. 1992)). 
104. 796 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 2011). 
105. Id. at 289. 
106. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000) (citing State v. 
Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1990)). But see State v. Hill, 871 N.W.2d 900, 904 
n.3 (Minn. 2015) (holding that Frye-Mack applies to all scientific evidence, not just
novel techniques, but that the focus should be on the foundational reliability prong 
if general acceptance is not at issue). 
107. See Obeta, 796 N.W.2d at 289. 
108. 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012). 
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foundational reliability test.109 The court avoided deciding whether 
Frye-Mack was appropriate110 and instead concluded that the district 
court’s Frye-Mack foundational reliability test was substantially the 
same as the foundational reliability test articulated in MRE 702.111 
Since Doe in 2012, the Minnesota Supreme Court has made no major 
changes to Frye-Mack.112 
III. ANALYSIS: UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS WITH FRYE-MACK
This Note analyzes Minnesota court decisions to identify and 
explain three presently unresolved questions with Frye-Mack: (1) 
what constitutes a novel scientific theory,113 (2) what is general 
acceptance,114 and (3) what is the proper analysis under the 
foundational reliability prong.115 This analysis seeks to highlight 
evolving inconsistencies with the Frye-Mack standard for admitting 
expert testimony.116 
109. Id. at 166. 
 110. Id. at 165 (“[I]f we conclude that the district court properly excluded Doe’s 
evidence under one of the first three parts of [MRE 702], we need not consider 
whether the theory of repressed and recovered memory is subject to the Frye-Mack 
standard.”). But see id. at 178 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the court of 
appeals that Frye-Mack is not the appropriate analytical framework for evaluating the 
admissibility of the proffered expert testimony). 
111. See id. at 169 (majority opinion) (“Nominally, the district court conducted 
a Frye-Mack foundational reliability analysis, but its conclusions and findings on the 
theory . . . were a de facto Rule 702 analysis.”). 
 112. However, in 2015, the Minnesota Supreme Court articulated yet another 
iteration of Frye-Mack. In State v. Hill, the court made no mention of the “novel” 
requirement. 871 N.W.2d 900, 904 n.3 (Minn. 2015). Instead, the court stated that 
when general acceptance is conceded, courts must focus on the second prong, 
which requires proof “that the generally accepted methodology ‘produced reliable 
results in the specific case.’” Id. (quoting State v. Bailey, 677 N.W.2d 380, 397–98 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004)). 
113. See infra Section III.A. 
114. See infra Section III.B. 
115. See infra Section III.C. 
116. MINN. R. EVID. 702 is titled “Testimony by Experts,” but its language also 
includes references to “opinion” and “evidence.” Case law has followed this pattern. 
Accordingly, this Note uses expert “evidence,” “testimony,” and “opinion” 
interchangeably to refer to subject matter governed by Frye-Mack or MRE 702. 
Moreover, because so much of Frye-Mack and MRE 702’s effect is felt at the trial court 
level, this analysis will discuss several published and unpublished district court and 
appellate court decisions that are not themselves precedential. 
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A. What Is Novel Scientific Theory Under MRE 702? 
Frye’s general acceptance requirement for novel expert 
testimony was intended, in part, to guard against junk science.117 
Science is complex, fast-evolving, and full of genuine disagreement 
on the validity of methodologies and conclusions upon which judges 
and juries heavily rely.118 Experts can now be retained to support a 
party’s position on almost any issue.119 Controversial theories to 
support expert opinions are commonplace.120 Some of these 
controversial theories are newly-developed, others have long been 
controversial, but all present problems for a judge who is 
uneducated on the subject matter.121 How can a court balance 
helpful expert testimony against the risk of admitting unreliable 
expert testimony? Frye answers this question by distinguishing novel 
scientific theory from non-novel theory, requiring general 
acceptance of the former but not the latter.122 Naturally, the 
question becomes: what is novel? 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 plainly limits the general 
acceptance requirement to opinions or evidence involving novel 
scientific theory.123 A finding of novel scientific theory, then, is a 
prerequisite to analysis of general acceptance.124 In Frye, the court 
created this “novel” label to describe the lack of precedent regarding 
admissibility of the scientific technique at issue.125 The Frye court also 
noted that the “novel” label describes the newness of the 
 117. See generally Price & Kelly, supra note 3 (examining the problem of and 
possible solutions to junk science in the courtroom). 
118. See Hanson, supra note 2, at 286. 
 119. See David Sonenshein & Charles Fitzpatrick, The Problem of Partisan Experts 
and the Potential for Reform Through Concurrent Evidence, 32 REV. LITIG. 1, 3–15 (2013) 
(discussing the use of scientific experts in the courtroom and the related problem 
of bias). 
120. Id. at 25 (discussing the controversial nature of litigation-driven research). 
121. See Milich, supra note 45, at 924–26. 
122. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 809 (Minn. 2000). 
123. MINN. R. EVID. 702. (“[I]f the opinion or evidence involves novel scientific 
theory, the proponent must establish that the underlying scientific evidence is 
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.”). 
124. See id. 
 125. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“Counsel for 
defendant, in their able presentation of the novel question involved, correctly state 
in their brief that no cases directly in point have been found.”). 
16
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 5
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss3/5
642 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3 
technique.126 Novel stems from the theory’s lack of precedent and 
lack of proven validity.127 
Minnesota has long applied its own Frye-Mack standard, which is 
intended to help judges make uniform decisions by letting the 
scientific community determine the theory’s scientific merit.128 
While Frye-Mack judges are to rely on scientists to decide the 
acceptance and reliability of the science, it is up to judges to make 
the initial determination that the scientific theory at issue is novel 
and thus subject to Frye-Mack.129 This undertaking can be broken 
down into two interrelated but separable questions: (1) what is novel, 
and (2) what is scientific theory. 
1. What Is Novel Under MRE 702?
The comments to the 2006 amendment to MRE 702 state that 
“[t]he rule does not define what is novel, leaving this for resolution 
by the courts.”130 In 2007, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
Frye-Mack applies to “evidence based on emerging scientific 
techniques.”131 Minnesota courts have not clarified when techniques 
are no longer emerging or novel, but have commonly applied two 
approaches. 
The first approach to analyzing the applicability of Frye-Mack is 
to use “general acceptance” as the standard for judging whether a 
technique is novel. Zandi v. Wyeth illustrates this approach.132 In 
Zandi, the plaintiff sought to introduce into evidence the results of a 
rarely used test to prove that the defendant pharmaceutical 
company’s hormone therapy caused the plaintiff’s breast cancer.133 
The court reasoned that the test was novel because the test was 
 126. Id. (“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between 
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.”). 
127. See id. 
128. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000). 
129. See State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2002) (holding that 
a pretrial hearing on the first Frye-Mack prong is needed unless the court has 
reviewed and confirmed the evidence’s general acceptance). 
130. MINN. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment. 
 131. Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 528 (Minn. 2007) 
(quoting State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 419 (Minn. 1992)). 
132. No. 27-CV-06-6744, 2007 WL 3224242 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 2007). 
133. See id. at *4, *8. 
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“clearly not generally accepted in the scientific community for the 
purpose for which it is here proffered.”134 
This approach makes a judge’s determination more objective.135 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 implies a two-step approach: (1) 
determine whether a novel scientific theory is at issue, and if so, (2) 
analyze general acceptance.136 Using general acceptance as the 
threshold for novelty may save a step in this analysis. If a judge is 
asked whether a technique is novel and it is not clear, then 
determining that the technique is generally accepted answers 
questions steps one and two simultaneously. If no instructive 
precedent guides the “novel” determination but the evidence 
arguably triggers Frye-Mack, then diving into general acceptance is 
the logical solution. 
However, this approach creates confusion. Essentially, MRE 702 
and Frye-Mack ask “the question: When is a novel scientific test not a 
novel scientific test[?]”137 Under the above analysis, “the answer is: 
when it is ‘generally accepted.’”138 However, this approach ignores 
the language in MRE 702. The first question being asked in Frye-Mack 
under MRE 702 is whether the opinion or evidence involves a novel 
scientific theory.139 The answer to this question matters. If yes, then 
the proponent must prove general acceptance,140 an expensive 
endeavor typically requiring the proponent to hire more experts.141 
If not, then the proponent need only prove the other MRE 702 
requirements.142 But, if the court conflates novelty with general 
 134. Id. at *23; see also Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 62-C9-
06-003962, 2009 WL 5576242, at *2 n.1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009) (ruling that 
repressed memory research was subject to Frye-Mack because it “has never been 
scrutinized under the Frye-Mack standard as being generally accepted within the 
relevant scientific community”), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 
817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012). 
135. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000). 
136. MINN. R. EVID. 702. 
137. Amicus Curiae Brief for Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association at 38, Goeb 
v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000) (No. CX-98-2275), 1999 MN S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 3, at *38. 
138. Id. 
139. MINN. R. EVID. 702. 
140. See id. 
141. See 11 PETER N. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: EVIDENCE § 703.04 
(4th ed. 2016) (noting that Frye-Mack hearings are expensive and time consuming 
for parties involved). 
142. See id. (scrutinizing the expert opinion for foundational reliability). 
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acceptance, then the language in MRE 702 becomes less meaningful 
and the evidence rightly subject to Frye-Mack becomes less clear. 
A second approach used by lower courts to define novelty is to 
rely on Minnesota appellate court precedent. Under this approach, 
a technique is no longer novel, and thus no Frye-Mack hearing is 
required, once Minnesota’s appellate courts “ha[ve] reviewed and 
confirmed the general acceptance of a scientific technique.”143 Trial 
courts define this inquiry narrowly: if general acceptance has not 
been expressly confirmed for the precise technique at issue, then the 
technique remains novel.144 For example, in State v. Edstrom,145 the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals found a Frye-Mack hearing necessary 
despite acceptance and admission of the scientific technique in 
other contexts.146 Similarly, the trial court in Peterson v. Progressive 
Contractors, Inc.147 stated that “[a] technique may be considered 
‘novel’ if it differs from older techniques and has never been 
considered by the appellate courts.”148 
 143. State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2002). The court in 
Roman Nose discredited the State’s argument that general acceptance in other 
jurisdictions is sufficient to deem the evidence not novel in Minnesota courts. Id. at 
820–22. The court stated that this approach “would be a departure from our 
precedent requiring a Frye-Mack hearing to determine general acceptance within 
the relevant scientific community.” Id. at 820. However, courts have also struggled 
when the technique does not plainly appear to be novel in any sense but has yet to 
be ruled so by Minnesota courts. For example, in State v. Edwards, the court was 
tasked with interpreting whether gunshot residue evidence was generally accepted. 
See No. 55-K4-06-414, 2006 WL 6626516, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 7, 2006) 
(explaining that a Frye-Mack hearing was held on the admissibility of the gunshot 
residue during the court trial). Without any express Frye-Mack precedent on the 
technique at issue, the court excluded the evidence based on precedent from other 
jurisdictions and a 1974 Minnesota Supreme Court general discussion of the 
technique. Id. at *2–9. 
 144. See Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d at 822 (holding that general acceptance of one 
method of DNA testing does not provide proper justification to conclude general 
acceptance of a sufficiently different technique of DNA testing). 
145. 792 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 146. Id. at 110 (holding that, while the scientific technique at issue, gas 
headspace chromatography, had been admitted and analyzed by previous 
Minnesota courts in other contexts and was arguably not novel, there was no district 
court error in finding the evidence novel); see also State v. Zanter, No. K3-00-1789, 
2002 WL 34437339, at *5 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2002) (involving “the novel 
question of whether mitochondrial DNA identification evidence is admissible in 
Minnesota courts”). 
147. No. 71-CV-07-1295, 2008 WL 8487936 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2008). 
148. Id. (citing Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d at 821). 
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This precedent-based approach, by definition, relies on 
appellate courts to rule on a case’s merits to create precedent upon 
which lower courts can rely. District court findings are not 
sufficient.149 Unfortunately, Minnesota’s high courts have neglected 
this duty on occasion.150 Justice Meyer recognized that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court “do[es] a disservice to district courts and 
the administration of criminal justice in this state by declining to 
decide the issue on its merits.”151 Because lower courts rely so greatly 
on precedent, appellate courts’ failure to rule on case merits may 
result in scientific techniques remaining novel until a subsequent 
determination is made. This may lead to more Frye-Mack hearings on 
the same purportedly novel theories, resulting in less uniform 
decisions and increased expense.152 Because Goeb emphasized 
uniformity as justification for retaining Frye-Mack,153 this presents 
cause for concern. 
2. What Is Scientific Theory Under MRE 702?
The question of novelty differs slightly from the problem of 
determining what categories of testimony are scientific under MRE 
702 and Frye-Mack. “A Frye-Mack hearing is only necessary when the 
 149. The dissent in Roman Nose recognized this, stating that the majority ignored 
three recent district court findings of general acceptance when it instead required 
a hearing unless the supreme court has confirmed the scientific technique. 649 
N.W.2d at 824–25 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 150. See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150, 165 
(Minn. 2012) (“Therefore, if we conclude that the district court properly excluded 
Doe’s evidence under one of the first three parts of [MRE 702], we need not 
consider whether the theory of repressed and recovered memory is subject to the 
Frye-Mack standard.”); State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 294 n.9 (Minn. 2011) (“We 
express no opinion on whether a Frye-Mack hearing is necessary in order to admit 
expert testimony on typical rape-victim behaviors.”); State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 
104 (Minn. 2010) (refusing to rule on the admissibility of fingerprint evidence 
under Frye-Mack because any error committed in admitting the evidence was 
harmless). 
 151. Hull, 788 N.W.2d. at 108 (Meyer, J., concurring); see also Jacobson v. 
$55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 534 (Minn. 2007) (Hanson, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he court did not address the issue relevant to a Frye-Mack test, 
namely, whether the theories . . . were generally accepted in the scientific 
community.”). 
 152. See 11 THOMPSON, supra note 141 (noting that courts’ refusal to decide 
issues on the merits may cause an increase in time-consuming and expensive Frye-
Mack hearings). 
153. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000). 
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evidence at issue was obtained using a technique that is both scientific 
and novel.”154 The Minnesota Supreme Court has referred to 
“scientific” evidence under MRE 702 as evidence based on a 
“scientific process, principle, technique or device.”155 
The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished scientific 
evidence from traditional expert testimony due to its potential to 
mislead triers of fact uneducated in science.156 In State v. 
MacLennan,157 the court accurately described this dilemma by 
deeming a Frye test “appropriate when the experimental, mechanical 
or theoretical nature of the scientific evidence ha[s] the potential to 
mislead lay jurors awed by an aura of mystic infallibility surrounding 
scientific techniques, experts and the fancy devices employed.”158 
This background guides analysis of two related questions. First, what 
is to be done with testimony that is not “scientific” in a traditional 
sense? Second, does the purpose for which the testimony is being 
proffered change Frye-Mack’s applicability? 
In answering question one, courts find no guidance from Goeb 
or MRE 702.159 The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that Frye-
Mack is inapplicable when no variety of physical or “hard science” is 
involved.160 Examples of non-scientific theories include drug dog-
sniffs,161 ten-point gang identification criteria,162 and parenting 
assessments in child protection matters.163 Courts have also held 
arguably scientific evidence to not trigger Frye-Mack if what is truly 
being challenged is a formula, calculation, or process. Examples 
include expert testimony regarding retrograde extrapolation 
mathematical formulas,164 use of an amount of electrical resistance 
 154. State v. Edstrom, 702 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis 
added) (citing State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577, 585 (Minn. 1994)). 
 155. Jacobson, 728 N.W.2d at 529 (quoting State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1320 
(Ariz. 1984)). 
156. See Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 812–13. 
157. 702 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 2005). 
158. Id. at 232 (quoting State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1110 (Conn. 1993)). 
159. See MINN. R. EVID. 702 (applicable to all scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge); Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814 (holding Frye-Mack applicable to 
novel scientific theories). 
160. Jacobson, 728 N.W.2d at 528–29. 
161. Id. 
162. State v. Deshay, 645 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding ten-
point gang identification criteria to not be scientific in a Frye-Mack sense). 
 163. In re Welfare of the Children of S.E.N. & R.D.J., Jr., No. A15-2009, 2016 WL 
2946278, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016). 
164. State v. Jensen, 482 N.W.2d 238, 239 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
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on a dairy cow,165 and the process of converting an analog signal into 
a digital signal.166 
Unlike traditional scientific theory involving physical scientific 
tests, social science theories and research techniques have clumsily 
been subject to Frye-Mack.167 In 1991, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
declined to decide whether expert psychological testimony should 
be examined under Frye-Mack.168 Later, the court in MacLennan 
declined to categorize expert testimony on battered child syndrome 
as a scientific theory, stating that “expert testimony on syndromes, 
unlike DNA evidence or other physical science, is not the type of 
evidence that the analytic framework established by Frye-Mack was 
designed to address.”169 Conversely, the court earlier held that 
hypnotically refreshed testimony was subject to Frye, despite not 
being mechanical or scientific in nature.170 
In answering question two—whether the purpose for which the 
evidence is proffered has any bearing on admissibility—there is a 
similar lack of instruction from Minnesota precedent. The 
MacLennan court drew a distinction between “scientific evidence 
derived from a specific test or diagnosis and expert testimony that 
offers an explanation for a person’s behavior.”171 The court stated 
that experts testifying about a scientific theory to help a jury 
understand conduct differs from testimony regarding physical 
science being used to prove whether a party suffers from a 
condition.172 While the MacLellan court fell on the side of admitting 
syndrome evidence,173 the supreme court has also excluded 
 165. Poppler v. Wright Hennepin Coop. Elec. Ass’n, 834 N.W.2d 527, 541 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (clarifying that the expert’s use of 200 ohms “is the result of 
scientific tests applying scientific techniques that are based on scientific theory,” but 
is not itself a scientific theory). 
166. State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 722 (Minn. 2007). 
167. See State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 230 n.2 (Minn. 2005). 
168. State v. Kraushaar, 470 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Minn. 1991). 
169. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d. at 233. Courts have likewise not applied Frye-Mack 
to battered woman’s syndrome evidence. See, e.g., State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 
189 (Minn. 1997) (allowing battered woman’s syndrome evidence to explain a 
victim’s delay in reporting the crime); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 
1989) (allowing the evidence to prove self-defense); State v. Plantin, 682 N.W.2d 
653 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing the evidence to assist a jury in understanding 
a victim’s justification for recanting a story). 
170. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980). 
171. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d at 232–33. 
172. Id. 
173. The MacLennan court said that while syndrome evidence was admissible, it 
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syndrome evidence being offered to explain a condition if the 
evidence is not necessary for the jury to decide the dispute.174 
This distinction regarding the testimony’s purpose was again 
addressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Doe v. Archdiocese of St. 
Paul & Minneapolis.175 In Doe, the plaintiffs sought to introduce 
experts solely to explain the general condition of repressed memory 
to help the jury understand the victim’s conduct and testimony.176 
The experts were not intending to testify that the plaintiff suffered 
from repressed memory syndrome but to assist the trier of fact in its 
determinations.177 The court acknowledged this distinction in its 
foundational reliability analysis but declined to address whether the 
fact that the testimony was limited to general background had any 
bearing on the appropriate standard to be used.178 
In contrast to Minnesota courts, federal courts governed by 
Daubert need not wrestle with questions of novelty or scientific 
theory. Kumho Tire rendered these distinctions irrelevant by 
extending Daubert’s applicability to all expert testimony.179 The 
Supreme Court recognized that “no clear line” distinguishes 
scientific evidence from other specialized knowledge in a way that is 
capable of application in particular cases.180 This recognition 
highlights the difficulty in requiring a court using Frye to determine 
whether a novel scientific theory is at issue before applying the 
general acceptance test.181 
The lack of guidance on how a court must determine whether 
expert testimony is subject to Frye-Mack is problematic. In cases 
also had to be relevant. Id. at 230. While the supreme court found that the district 
court erred in applying the Frye-Mack standard, the supreme court then turned to 
whether there was reversible error and found that the proof MacLellan submitted 
did “not support the admission of the expert testimony on battered child 
syndrome.” Id. at 234–35. 
 174. See State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982) (“Rape trauma 
syndrome is not a fact-finding tool, but a therapeutic tool [which] does not assist 
the jury in its fact-finding function . . . .”). 
 175. See Respondent’s Brief and Addendum, Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & 
Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150 (2012) (No. A10-1951), 2011 WL 8815649, at *20 (“In 
the case of behavioral or social science testimony that is offered to explain certain 
conduct, . . . the Frye test is inapplicable to such evidence.”). 
176. Id. at *17–18. 
177. Id. at *17. 
178. See Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d at 168. 
179. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999). 
180. Id. at 148. 
181. See id. 
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involving social science or syndrome evidence, the lack of guidance 
is particularly problematic—evidence is needed to explain behavior 
that could otherwise appear irrational to a juror.182 If Minnesota 
desires to retain Frye-Mack, then the Minnesota Supreme Court 
would best achieve Frye-Mack’s goals by articulating a standard under 
which trial courts could more consistently decide to which testimony 
Frye-Mack applies.183 
B. What Is General Acceptance Under MRE 702? 
For opinions or evidence involving novel scientific theory, “the 
proponent must establish that the underlying scientific evidence is 
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.”184 The general 
acceptance requirement for novel scientific theory represents a 
principal difference between Frye-Mack and Daubert. In Frye-Mack, 
general acceptance, if required, is dispositive (i.e., failure to prove 
general acceptance is fatal to any expert testimony that the court 
finds to involve a novel scientific theory).185 Conversely, under 
Daubert, general acceptance is merely one factor that may bear on 
admissibility.186 
Goeb stated that Frye-Mack’s general acceptance requirement 
“ensures that the persons most qualified to assess the scientific 
validity of a technique have the determinative voice.”187 Instead of 
forcing judges to become amateur scientists,188 judges under Frye-
Mack defer to the relevant scientific community to gauge whether 
the theory’s acceptance has reached the necessary threshold.189 
Despite ultimately reaffirming Frye-Mack, the Goeb court recognized 
three potentially problematic questions left unanswered in a Frye-
Mack test: (1) whether the court must look to general acceptance of 
the technique or of the underlying scientific principle, (2) who is the 
relevant scientific community, and (3) what threshold meets general 
 182. See Peter B. Knapp, The Other Shoe Drops: Minnesota Rejects Daubert, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 997, 1022 (2000) (noting the need to articulate a standard for 
admissibility of “social framework” testimony). 
183. See id. 
184. MINN. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). 
185. See id. 
186. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
187. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000). 
188. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
189. See Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 813. 
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acceptance.190 This Note will address each of these question in turn 
to analyze whether courts since Goeb have provided any useful 
answers. 
1. General Acceptance of What?
Frye initially required general acceptance of the technique and 
the underlying theory.191 Later, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated 
that general acceptance applies to the scientific technique or 
principle at issue.192 The court also stated that scientific testing is not 
a prerequisite for proving general acceptance,193 implying that 
general acceptance of the underlying theory or principle, rather 
than the scientific test itself, may suffice. The court has also 
described the general acceptance prong as asking “whether experts 
in the field widely share the view that the results of the scientific 
testing are scientifically reliable.”194 These interpretations subtly but 
significantly vary and together reveal the difficulty in determining 
what precisely must be generally accepted under Frye-Mack. 
In Zandi v. Wyeth,195 the trial court demanded that a very narrow 
proposition be generally accepted.196 The scientific theory being 
proffered was that the defendant’s hormone therapy caused the 
plaintiff’s breast cancer.197 The plaintiff, seeking to prove general 
acceptance of the underlying scientific theory, introduced a 
multitude of corroborating studies and the results of a differential 
diagnosis.198 While the plaintiff argued that the studies showed long-
term hormone therapy to be the predominant cause of breast 
cancer, the court was not convinced.199 In holding the studies 
insufficient to prove general acceptance, the court articulated the 
specific deficiency in the plaintiff’s argument: 
190. Id. 
191. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1975). 
192. Sentinel Mgmt. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 615 N.W.2d 819, 824 (Minn. 
2000). 
193. Id. at 827. 
194. State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 2002). 
195. No. 27-CV-06-6744, 2007 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 12 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 
2007), aff’d, No. A08-1455, 2009 WL 2151141 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 2009). 
196. See id. at *12. 
197. See id. at *3. 
198. See id. at *13. 
199. See id. at *20–21 (“[T]he Court can find no support for the proposition that 
[hormone therapy] is the ‘predominant cause’ of breast cancer in a woman who has 
taken [hormone therapy] for 17 years.”). 
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[T]he “thing from which the deduction is made” is the 
proposition that [hormone therapy] causes breast cancer; 
the “deduction” which is made from the “thing” is the 
conclusion that [hormone therapy] caused Plaintiff’s 
particular cancer. . . . [E]ven if Plaintiff could show that the 
“thing from which the deduction is made” was generally 
accepted in the scientific community, Plaintiff’s 
proposition is not a “thing” from which to make the 
deduction the Doctors propose to make. 
In this case, the “thing” from which the Doctors could 
deduce the probable cause of Plaintiff’s cancer would be a 
scientific methodology allowing a doctor to determine, in 
hindsight, the likely causes of breast cancer in an individual 
woman. Plaintiff has provided no evidence of any such 
methodology.200 
In Zandi, then, the district court required that the specific 
proposition on which the plaintiff’s argument relied be generally 
accepted, not the general underlying scientific theory.201 On appeal, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, stating that 
“Zandi fail[ed] to demonstrate that there is a method for diagnosing 
the cause of an individual’s breast cancer that is generally accepted 
in the relevant scientific community.”202 
In contrast, a set of cases very similar to Zandi, collectively titled 
In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation v. Wyeth,203 was argued under 
Daubert. At a bellwether trial, the federal district court found the 
defendants liable for the plaintiff’s breast cancer and awarded the 
plaintiff compensatory damages.204 The district court applied Daubert 
to admit testimony from the plaintiff’s expert witness to support 
200. Id. at *36–38. 
 201. Telephone Interview with Stuart L. Goldenberg, Senior Partner, 
Goldenberg Law (Oct. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Goldenberg]. Product liability 
attorney Stuart Goldenberg described how Zandi has affected the way judges apply 
Frye-Mack. Mr. Goldenberg stated that civil defense attorneys occasionally cite to 
Zandi to argue that Frye-Mack should exclude any causation-dependent evidence that 
requires a differential diagnosis. However, he stated that it is uncommon for a judge 
to apply an analysis as stringently as the court did in Zandi. He further noted that 
proving causation in cases where the harm caused is cancer is an endeavor in which 
plaintiff-side attorneys commonly struggle. 
202. Zandi v. Wyeth, No. A08-1455, 2009 WL 2151141, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. July 
21, 2009). 
203. 586 F.3d 547 (8th Cir. 2009). 
204. Id. at 553. 
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causation.205 On appeal at the Eighth Circuit, the court found that 
the expert’s differential diagnosis sufficiently established that the 
defendants’ hormones were necessary to the development of the 
plaintiff’s tumor.206 Accordingly, the court rejected the defendants’ 
argument that the plaintiff’s expert’s methodology was neither 
sound nor accepted.207 
This comparison supports the contention that Daubert 
represents a “relax[ation of] the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ 
testimony.”208 While Daubert and Frye-Mack both focus on scrutiny of 
the evidence’s methodology,209 the analysis under Daubert gives less 
weight to the general acceptance finding.210 Moreover, Daubert, 
unlike Frye-Mack, does not entirely limit a court’s scrutiny to 
methodology.211 This flexibility allows a Daubert court to consider a 
broader range of evidence to meet a less stringent admissibility 
standard.212 As the Eighth Circuit noted, “[t]here is no single 
requirement for admissibility as long as the proffer indicates that the 
expert evidence is reliable and relevant.”213 If, as seen in Zandi, the 
“underlying scientific evidence” in MRE 702 is interpreted to mean 
the exact proposition being asserted, then Frye-Mack’s general 
acceptance requirement appears to make Frye-Mack a stiffer standard 
than Daubert.214 
205. See id. at 565. 
 206. Id. at 565–66. The Prempro Products court went on to distinguish its holding 
from Zandi, stating, “To the extent that Zandi excludes an expert opinion that relies 
on differential diagnosis to determine the cause of hormone-receptor-positive 
breast cancer in an individual with hormone-dependent breast cancer, we 
respectfully disagree.” Id. at 567 n.13. 
207. Id. at 567. Instead, the Wyeth court justified inclusion of the evidence 
because the defendants “had the opportunity to expose the testimony’s weaknesses 
through vigorous cross-examination and the presentation of contrary evidence.” Id. 
(citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993)). 
 208. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 
153, 169 (1988)). 
209. Id. at 592–93. 
210. Id. at 593–95 (discussing the factors a court may consider under Daubert). 
211. Compare General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (allowing a 
judge to consider the link between evidence and proffered opinion), with Goeb v. 
Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 815 (Minn. 2000) (limiting scrutiny to methodology). 
212. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. 
 213. In re Prempro Prod. Liab. Litig. v. Wyeth, 586 F.3d 547, 565 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Unrein v. Timesavers, Inc., 394 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2005)). 
214. The Eighth Circuit disagreed with Zandi’s exclusion of the evidence and 
noted that “Minnesota law requires a more conservative review of expert testimony 
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The Zandi decision, as compared to In re Prempro Products 
Liability Litigation, is a clear example in which Frye-Mack proved more 
demanding than Daubert because of how narrowly general 
acceptance was interpreted.215 However, some attorneys would argue 
that the lack of Minnesota precedent consistent with Zandi tells a 
different story.216 Under this argument, Zandi represents an 
exception to the idea that Frye-Mack is a tamer standard to which 
evidence is consistently applied without substantial dispute.217 
Whether or not Zandi represents the Frye-Mack rule or its exception, 
Zandi illuminates how determining what must be generally accepted 
under Frye can significantly alter the admissibility determination. 
than the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Id. at 567 n.13 
(distinguishing Zandi v. Wyeth, No. A08-1455, 2009 WL 2151141 (Minn. Ct. App. 
July 21, 2009)). 
 215. Zandi, 2009 WL 2151141, at *5–12. Analysis of fibromyalgia testimony 
provides another example in which Daubert’s flexible and discretionary standard 
resulted in courts admitting evidence that Frye-Mack excluded. Compare Epp v. 
Lauby, 715 N.W.2d 501, 511 (Neb. 2006) (holding under a Daubert standard that 
evidence sufficiently supported a theory of a causal relationship between physical 
trauma and fibromyalgia), and Reichert v. Phipps, 84 P.3d 353, 356, 364 (Wyo. 2004) 
(holding under Daubert that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence 
linking an auto accident to fibromyalgia), with Grant v. Boccia, 137 P.3d 20, 25 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (excluding under Frye testimony linking trauma and 
fibromyalgia per lack of general acceptance of a causal relationship between trauma 
and fibromyalgia in the scientific community). But see Maras v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., 
Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810–11 (D. Minn. 2005) (applying Daubert to exclude 
testimony proffered to establish that an auto accident aggravated fibromyalgia). 
 216. While not being litigated in Minnesota, recent decisions in the Johnson & 
Johnson Talcum Powder litigation resulted in Daubert proving tougher than Frye. In 
St. Louis Circuit Court, Missouri, which applies a Frye-Mack-like standard, three cases 
have survived challenges to expert testimony and have resulted in hundreds of 
millions in damages. See Nassim Benchaabane, St. Louis Jury Awards $70 Million to 
Woman Claiming Baby Powder Products Contributed to Her Cancer, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/st-louis-jury 
-awards-million-to-woman-claiming-baby-powder/article_6bfaef72-4dc6-50a3-af24    
-fe91944b79e6.html. Conversely, a New Jersey state court applied a standard closer 
to Daubert in excluding the plaintiff’s experts and ultimately dismissing two talcum 
powder lawsuits against Johnson & Johnson. See Kenneth Bradley, Johnson & Johnson 
Beats 2 Suits Claiming Talc Caused Cancer, 34 WESTLAW J. TOXIC TORTS 1, 4 (2016). 
 217. Goldenberg, supra note 201. This author spoke with Mr. Goldenberg about 
the Zandi and In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation decisions. Mr. Goldenberg 
believed Zandi to be the rare case in which a judge required general acceptance of 
such a precise proposition and argued that the lack of supportive case law reveals 
how infrequently general acceptance is fatal to expert testimony. 
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2. Who Is the Relevant Scientific Community?
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 requires that evidence 
admitted under the novel scientific theory be generally accepted in 
the relevant scientific community.218 Disagreement exists as to whom 
this community encompasses because the community may include 
practitioners, researchers, and others with knowledge, many of 
whom may have a personal stake in the case outcome.219 
Minnesota is one of the vast majority of states whose courts agree 
that the relevant scientific community extends beyond 
practitioners.220 Minnesota courts have interpreted Frye to allow all 
experts in the scientific field to be included in the relevant scientific 
community.221 This interpretation can cut both ways—favoring 
plaintiffs and defendants depending on the evidence at issue—but 
reveals how the result may change if a court manipulates the margins 
of the relevant community.222 While Frye intended to defer entirely 
to the relevant scientific community, a court’s definition of relevant 
scientific community clearly is discretionary and can shape a Frye 
hearing’s outcome.223 Despite this possibility, Minnesota’s broad 
approach does not appear to have caused glaring problems with Frye-
Mack. 
218. MINN. R. EVID. 702. 
 219. See generally Simon A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire and into the Fryeing Pan? 
Self-Validation, Meta-Expertise and the Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye 
Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 453, 473–80 (2008) (discussing the differing 
views on and consequences of how courts define “relevant scientific community”). 
220. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(rejecting the contention that polygraph evidence need only be generally accepted 
by polygraph operators); Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 
150, 161 (Minn. 2012) (discussing the relevant scientific community to include 
clinicians and researchers). 
 221. See State v. Fenney, 448 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Minn. 1989) (“Minnesota’s 
interpretation of Frye requires ‘experts in its field’ and has no such narrow 
requirement of disinterestedness.”); see also State v. Dixon, 822 N.W.2d 664, 674 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (defining the relevant scientific community as “experts in 
the field”). 
 222. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 397 (Alaska 1999) (noting that Frye has 
been criticized for its tendency to allow a court to manipulate relevant scientific 
field to shape general acceptance). 
 223. See Cole, supra note 219, at 473 (discussing how the definition of the 
relevant scientific community can shape a Frye determination in voice spectrography 
cases). 
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3. When Is a Theory Generally Accepted?
Even if the relevant scientific community is identified, just when 
that community has generally accepted a theory remains unclear. 
The Goeb court elected not to define general acceptance, instead 
leaving future case law to make determinations as “issues properly 
present themselves.”224 In defining this threshold, courts have held 
that experts in the field must widely share the view.225 However, 
courts have said that general acceptance “requires neither unanimity 
nor acceptance outside its particular field”226 and that courts may 
receive input on this inquiry from other jurisdictions.227 
The boundaries of the general acceptance threshold are 
explorable, though unsatisfyingly not revealed, by analyzing the 
recent case law on repressed memory syndrome. In C.A.H. v. 
Holden,228 the trial court was charged with determining whether 
repressed memory syndrome satisfied the Frye-Mack standard for the 
specific purpose of tolling a statute of limitations in a sexual abuse 
case.229 Applying a straightforward analysis, the court found 
repressed memory to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific 
community because the syndrome was included in the DSM-IV.230 
In 2009, the year before C.A.H. was decided, the Minnesota 
district court in Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis issued an 
opposite ruling.231 In Doe, a parishioner brought negligence and 
fraud claims against the archdiocese for the archdiocese’s role in 
alleged sexual abuse by one of its priests.232 As in C.A.H., the central 
question in Doe was whether the plaintiff could introduce general 
expert testimony regarding memory repression and recovery to toll 
224. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000). 
225. State v. Kromah, 657 N.W.2d 564, 565 n.2 (Minn. 2003). 
226. Fenney, 558 N.W.2d at 58. 
227. Id. at 61. 
228. C.A.H. v. Holden, No. 73-CV-09-7108, 2010 WL 6566538 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
Dec. 15, 2010). 
229. Id. 
 230. Id. The DSM-IV, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, “is 
a book of diagnoses and criteria published by the American Psychiatric Association 
and is based on professional consensus in the field of psychology.” Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
231. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, No. 62-C9-06-003962, 2009 WL 5576242 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 
817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012). 
232. Id. 
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a statute of limitations.233 The plaintiff’s two experts and the 
defendant’s three experts were quickly deemed representative of the 
relevant scientific community,234 but serious debate existed between 
the two sides regarding the syndrome’s validity. Some clinicians 
accepted that repressed and recovered memory was a valid theory 
and supported its diagnosis in the DSM-IV.235 Conversely, 
researchers communicated deep concerns with the theory and 
argued that the plaintiff failed to distinguish the theory from an 
ordinary person forgetting and later remembering an idea.236 Due 
to this lack of consensus, the court excluded the evidence, finding 
that “something cannot be both controversial and generally 
accepted.”237 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, finding Frye-Mack 
inapplicable because repressed memory evidence involved “[n]o 
‘method’ . . . for general acceptance or non-acceptance by the 
scientific community.”238 By taking this route, the court of appeals 
shed no light on whether repressed memory was generally accepted. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court likewise eluded answering the 
general acceptance question. The court neither accepted nor 
rejected the district court’s conclusion that evidence cannot be 
highly controversial and generally accepted.239 The court reasoned 
that Frye-Mack need not be applied if the evidence can be excluded 
under any of the first three parts in MRE 702.240 Accordingly, the 
court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the evidence under 
the foundational reliability prong and performed no formal Frye 
analysis.241 
 233. Id. The experts were not intending to testify about the plaintiff specifically; 
instead, the experts intended only to testify generally about repressed memory 
condition to help the jury understand the plaintiff’s conduct and testimony. 
Respondent’s Brief and Addendum, Doe, 817 N.W.2d 150 (No. A10-1951), 2011 WL 
8815649, at *17–18. 
234. Doe, 2009 WL 5576242 at *8. 
 235. See id. The DSM-IV “is a tool used mainly by clinical psychologists and 
psychiatrists . . . to diagnose mental illness.” Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 161 n.4. 
236. Doe, 2009 WL 5576242 at *24–25. 
237. Id. at *22. 
238. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 801 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150. 
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The inconsistency between C.A.H. and each of the three Doe 
decisions rekindles the debate underlying Goeb’s holding. The trial 
court in Doe noted considerable uncertainty regarding repressed 
memory’s general acceptance.242 “Since the purpose of a Frye-
Mack hearing is so the court is not called upon to play the role of 
scientist, the court defers resolution of this great debate to the 
relevant scientific community . . . .”243 Was Frye-Mack intended to 
preclude any reliability or helpfulness inquiry if the defendant’s 
experts convinced the trial court that the evidence was not generally 
accepted? If not, would a more discretionary analysis by a Daubert 
judge deliver a different outcome? 
Under Daubert, the district court’s analysis in Doe would have 
differed. Controversy within the scientific community does not 
necessarily exclude the evidence under Daubert.244 Under Daubert, 
each judge faced with novel scientific evidence must perform “‘a 
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether the 
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in 
issue.’”245 This assessment may allow “shaky but admissible” 
testimony attackable by cross-examination, contrary evidence, and 
careful jury instruction.246 Under this discretionary Daubert test, 
several courts have admitted the same repressed memory testimony 
that Doe excluded.247 
 242. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 62-C9-06-003962, 2009 
WL 5576242 at *24–25 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009) (“The court is struck by the 
deep controversy surrounding the question of whether or not repressed and 
recovered memory is a real psychiatric condition or a much more natural process 
involving something closer to a process of normal forgetting.”), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 
203, rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150.  
243. Id. at *25. 
 244. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) 
(“‘General acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of 
scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . .”). 
245. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 811 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 592–93). 
246. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. 
 247. See, e.g., Clark v. Edison, 881 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Mass. 2012); Shahzade v. 
Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286 (D. Mass. 1996) (finding repressed memory to satisfy the 
requisite validity and reliability under the Daubert standard); Isely v. Capuchin 
Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (denying defendant’s motion to 
exclude testimony concerning repressed memory syndrome under the Daubert 
standard). But see Hunter v. Brown, No. 03A01-9504-CV-00127, 1996 WL 57944 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (excluding repressed memory evidence under Daubert 
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Whether or not the evidence in Doe should have been admitted, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Doe created more questions than it 
answered. Frye-Mack was intended to achieve uniformity among 
district courts.248 The discrepancy between C.A.H. and Doe reveals 
the difficulty of achieving this end. However, the varying district 
court decisions are less problematic than the uncertainty present 
after the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Doe did not resolve 
the question of general acceptance based on inclusion in the DSM-
IV or of the theory in general.249 The Doe trial court found no general 
acceptance of the same theory due to controversy,250 the Doe 
appellate court found general acceptance irrelevant because the 
science was not subject to Frye-Mack,251 and the Doe supreme court 
gave no answer on general acceptance but found the evidence 
foundationally unreliable.252 To further complicate things, the Doe 
supreme court’s foundational reliability analysis seemed to include 
consideration of general acceptance, which further complicates Frye-
Mack.253 A trial court determining general acceptance of repressed 
memory, or similar social science evidence, has little more guidance 
after Doe than before it. Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
failure in Doe to decide general acceptance sets an unstable 
precedent that fails to carry out Frye-Mack’s uniformity objective. 
C. What Does Foundational Reliability Entail? 
In most cases, the disputed evidence is not novel and is generally 
accepted, thus the case centers on foundational reliability.254 
because it is too contradictory), aff’d on other grounds, 955 S.W.2d 49 (1997). 
248. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814. 
 249. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150, 161 n.5, 
170 n.8 (Minn. 2012). 
250. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 62-C9-06-003962, 2009 
WL 5576242, at *25 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2011), rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150. 
251. Doe, 801 N.W.2d at 207, rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150. 
252. Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 165. 
253. See infra Section III.C.2. 
254. Goldenberg, supra note 201; Weiner, supra note 48. These attorneys agreed 
that only in rare cases is purportedly “novel” evidence proffered. Even if the defense 
argues that a Frye hearing is required, these attorneys find that, in a vast majority of 
cases, proving a methodology’s general acceptance is a relatively objective, 
undisputed hurdle. Therefore, these attorneys focus on developing an expert’s 
foundational reliability for the testimony being proffered because this is commonly 
the bulk of the dispute before a judge. 
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Foundational reliability represents the “Mack” prong in the two-
pronged Frye-Mack test.255 After analyzing general acceptance, Mack 
directs a court to determine the reliability of the evidence.256 If the 
evidence is no longer considered novel, then a court is to focus on 
this Mack prong.257 
The 2006 amendment to MRE 702, which codified Goeb, 
requires that all evidence, not just novel scientific evidence, have 
foundational reliability.258 Foundational reliability for novel 
scientific theory subject to Frye-Mack “requires the ‘proponent of a 
. . . test to establish that the test itself is reliable and that its 
administration in the particular instance conformed to the 
procedure necessary to ensure reliability.’”259 Foundational 
reliability for all other testimony under MRE 702 “requires a district 
court to consider the purpose for which the expert testimony is 
being offered, the reliability of the underlying theory, and the 
reliability of the evidence in the particular case.”260 Thus, MRE 702 
appears to recognize two separate but related standards: one for 
scientific expert testimony and another for non-scientific expert 
opinion.261 The advisory committee comments noted, however, that 
the foundational reliability test will vary by context.262 
The following analysis is organized in two parts. The first part 
examines how Minnesota courts analyze foundational reliability. The 
second part focuses on Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis to 
examine whether Minnesota courts are beginning to implicitly 
accept a Daubert-like analysis. 
255. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 810 (Minn. 2000). 
256. Id.  
257. State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 2002). 
258. MINN. R. EVID. 702. 
259. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814 (citing State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 
1990)). 
260. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150, 169 (Minn. 
2012). 
 261. MINN. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment (“If 
the opinion or evidence involves a scientific test, the case law requires that the judge 
assure that the proponent establish that ‘the test itself is reliable and that its 
administration in the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to 
ensure reliability.’” (quoting Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814)). 
262. Id. 
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1. Foundational Reliability Under MRE 702
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 requires only that “the 
opinion” have foundational reliability.263 Additionally, as with all 
expert testimony, the evidence must assist the trier of fact.264 
Foundational reliability determinations are largely discretionary.265 
These determinations are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard, which further expands a trial court’s discretion.266 
Despite this discretion, some trial courts applying Frye-Mack have 
been demanding and precise about the showing required to 
demonstrate foundational reliability. For instance, in Zandi v. Wyeth, 
the court excluded the plaintiff’s experts for lack of foundation.267 
Here, the plaintiff sought to establish foundation for evidence that 
the defendant’s hormone therapy caused the plaintiff’s breast 
cancer.268 Rather than rely on a broad foundation regarding the 
correlation between the drug and cancer, the court required 
foundation for the proposition that “there is a method by which a 
physician can determine the cause of breast cancer in a particular 
individual.”269 This presents a high obstacle for a party seeking to 
demonstrate foundation for testimony on a subject for which there 
exists an indiscrete number of potential causes. 
Similarly, in Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines,270 the trial court 
excluded expert testimony because it lacked foundational reliability 
sufficient to prove that the defendant’s fuel pump caused the 
plaintiff’s plane crash injuries.271 The court asked whether “the 
expert’s opinion [was] sufficiently reliable so the opinions rendered 
[were] not speculative and [would] assist the trier of fact.”272 The 
court recognized that the reliability requirement does not require 
exclusion of all other potential causation theories and stated that it 
is a jury’s duty to accept or reject an expert’s opinion.273 
263. MINN. R. EVID. 702. 
 264. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814 (citing State v. Nystrom, 596 N.W.2d 256, 259 
(Minn. 1999)). 
265. See State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1990). 
266. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d. at 815. 
267. No. 27-CV-06-6744, 2007 WL 3224242 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 2007). 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. No. 62-CV-12-9581, 2016 WL 4919830 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 16, 2016). 
271. Id. at *5–12. 
272. Id. at *5. 
273. Id. at *6 (citing Bernloehr v. Cent. Livestock Buying Co., 296 Minn. 222, 
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Nevertheless, after the jury awarded a $27 million verdict, the court 
awarded the defendant judgment as a matter of law because the 
plaintiff’s expert failed to employ scientifically reliable or valid 
testing methodology and failed to reliably discount alternate 
causes.274 
A less demanding test was applied in C.A.H. v. Holden.275 Here, 
the trial court was analyzing the plaintiff’s psychologist’s 
determination that the plaintiff suffered from repressed memory 
syndrome.276 The defendant then retained a psychologist who 
concluded that the plaintiff did not suffer from repressed 
memory.277 Both psychologists used comparable methodologies—a 
mix of testing, interviewing, and self-reporting—to evaluate the 
plaintiff.278 The trial court cited Goeb in concluding that the methods 
used were “common diagnostic practice in the field of psychology 
and, therefore, ha[ve] foundational reliability.”279 This foundational 
reliability determination was exclusively based on the reliability and 
consistency of the methods, not the validity of the science.280 This 
methodology-centered analysis is consistent with Goeb.281 
A similarly relaxed test was applied in Rush v. Jostock.282 The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a trial court determination that 
expert testimony was admissible to prove that a plaintiff was 
malingering her pain symptoms.283 Applying an analysis at odds with 
the district court’s conclusion in Doe, the Rush court held that 
evidence of malingering was admissible because the test to show 
malingering was included in the DSM-IV.284 Moreover, the court 
cited Frye-Mack but instead admitted the testimony as reliable based 
largely on the expert witness’s qualifications and experience.285 
225, 208 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1973)). 
274. Id. at *10–12. 
 275. C.A.H. v. Holden, No. 73-CV-09-7108, 2010 WL 6566538 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 





280. See id. 
281. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 816 (Minn. 2000) (affirming the 
district court’s conclusion that the expert’s methodology was unreliable). 
282. 710 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
283. Id. at 576. 
284. Id. at 573–77. 
285. See id. at 575–76, 575 n.2. 
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2. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis: The
Minnesota Supreme Court’s Subtle Shift Toward Daubert
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Doe v. Archdiocese of 
St. Paul & Minneapolis highlights three subtle shifts toward Daubert.286 
First, the court blended the foundational reliability tests for scientific 
and non-scientific testimony.287 Second, the court applied a factor-
based analysis similar to Daubert.288 Third, the court’s analysis 
implied that a judge may consider validity, not just reliability, in its 
foundational reliability analysis.289 
First, the supreme court in Doe moved away from Frye-Mack by 
merging previously separate foundational reliability tests.290 The trial 
court in Doe applied a Frye-Mack foundational reliability test, 
requiring the plaintiff to show that the theory of repressed memory 
“is reliable and trustworthy, based upon well-recognized scientific 
principles and independent validation, and that its administration in 
the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to 
ensure reliability.”291 Under this standard, the trial court found the 
studies underlying repressed memory syndrome unreliable because 
the studies did not provide sufficient information on the scope of a 
subject’s memory loss or the accuracy of the recovered memories.292 
Because the science at issue was not patently scientific, the 
plaintiff argued that a general MRE 702 foundational reliability test 
was appropriate.293 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis evaded 
this argument by holding that the foundational reliability 
requirement in MRE 702 is substantially the same for scientific and 
non-scientific expert opinions.294 Therefore, the supreme court held 
286. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 
2012). 
287. Id. at 168. 
288. Id. at 168–69. 
289. Id. at 166–68 (looking beyond methodology to analyze whether the 
evidence could prove the accuracy of plaintiff’s repressed memories). 
290. Id. at 168. 
 291. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 62-C9-06-003962, 2009 
WL 5576242 at *26 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009) (citing Sentinel Mgmt. Co. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 615 N.W.2d 819, 824 (Minn. 2000)), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 203 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012). 
292. Doe, 2009 WL 5576242 at *29. 
293. Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 166. 
294. Id. at 168. 
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that the trial court’s application of Frye-Mack instead of a more 
general MRE 702 test was a “de facto Rule 702 analysis.”295 
Based on this holding and MRE 702’s language, a trial judge 
must now analyze foundational reliability by asking whether “the 
theory forming the basis for the expert’s opinion or test is 
reliable.”296 This question requires consideration of “the purpose for 
which the expert testimony is being offered, the reliability of the 
underlying theory, and the reliability of the evidence in the 
particular case.”297 By eliminating in a foundational reliability 
analysis any formal distinctions between evidence subject to MRE 
702, the court moved closer to Daubert and Kumho Tire Co., which 
together allow a judge to discretionarily determine reliability of all 
expert testimony in light of the case’s particular circumstances.298 
Second, the Doe court hinted at a shift toward Daubert by 
applying a factor-based analysis. The Doe court stated that a district 
court need only examine “the relevant foundational reliability 
factors” in its analysis.299 Without enumerating the factors relevant, 
the supreme court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the 
plaintiff failed to establish the accuracy of repressed memories and 
failed to distinguish between repressed memory and forgetfulness.300 
In its opinion, the supreme court focused on three facts. First, 
the court stated that the studies underlying repressed memory did 
not distinguish repressed memory from other memory loss.301 
Second, the court agreed that “the accuracy of the recovered 
memories has not been scientifically established.”302 Third, the court 
found “that there was no way to tell whether a person was actually 
suffering from repressed memories in any given case.”303 These 
factors bear similarity to three Daubert factors: rate of error, general 
acceptance, and testability of the theory.304 
 295. Id. at 169. The court also stated that “it makes little difference whether the 
district court called the analysis a ‘Frye-Mack’ analysis or a ‘Rule 702’ analysis.” Id. at 
168. 
296. Id. at 166. 
297. Id. at 169. 
298. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999). 
299. Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 168. 




304. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993). 
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Third, the Doe court’s analysis resembled a Daubert analysis by 
looking past methodology and into validity. Goeb limited a court’s 
reliability analysis to methodology.305 In Doe, however, the court 
excluded the evidence based in part on accuracy grounds, not based 
solely on whether the underlying methodology was reliable and 
consistent.306 Specifically, the court relied on the trial court’s finding 
of insufficient proof that the plaintiff actually suffered from 
repressed memory.307 This analysis hints at a conclusion similar to 
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, which allows a judge to “conclude that 
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the 
opinion proffered.”308 
Frye-Mack intended to relieve judges from having to analyze an 
expert’s reasoning or deductions, instead leaving this issue for the 
jury.309 But, by applying an approach inclusive of validity and based 
loosely on factors, the court in Doe moved closer to Daubert and astray 
from Frye-Mack’s deferential, “nose counting” approach.310 Further, 
by deciding the case based on reliability—which is reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard—rather than general acceptance—
reviewed de novo—the court exercised even greater discretion. 
Doe triggers a key question about how Frye-Mack is now applied: 
if general acceptance plays a role in a foundational reliability 
analysis, and this foundational reliability analysis applies to all 
evidence under MRE 702, then what purpose does the added 
general acceptance requirement for novel scientific evidence serve? 
This question requires future scrutiny as courts continue to perform 
foundational reliability analyses consistent with Doe. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
One solution to the problems identified in this Note would be, 
as others have argued,311 to join the vast majority of courts that apply 
Daubert. However, given how politically charged this debate is, 
compromise may be prudent. Another solution would be to retain 
305. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 816 (Minn. 2000). 
306. See Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 168. 
307. Id. at 168. 
308. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.136, 146 (1997). 
309. See Sentinel Mgmt. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 615 N.W.2d 819, 823–24 
(Minn. 2000) (holding that validity of an expert’s extrapolation goes to weight, not 
admissibility, and is thus a jury question). 
310. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 813. 
311. See, e.g., Gildea, supra note 49, at 105–09; Harley, supra note 68, at 497–508. 
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Frye’s deferential qualities and reconcile the inconsistencies 
identified in this Note. To do so, several changes should be 
considered. 
First, it would be sensible to redefine what evidence is subject to 
a general acceptance test. Presently, general acceptance applies to 
all novel scientific theory.312 Trying to determine whether evidence 
is scientific has proven problematic.313 Accordingly, it would 
behoove the Minnesota Supreme Court to narrow the applicability 
of Frye’s general acceptance test to novel testimony of the “hard 
science” variety. Science of this categorization (chemistry, physics, 
biology, and similar physical or mechanical processes), as compared 
to social or behavioral science, presents the highest risk of 
misleading triers of fact.314 For “hard” science that is deemed novel 
or cutting edge, Frye can appropriately be applied to ensure judges 
properly defer to the scientific field.315 For social or behavior science, 
as seen in MacLellan and Doe, a traditional MRE 702 analysis can 
sufficiently ensure helpfulness, qualification, and reliability.316 
Next, to ensure proper application of this standard, Minnesota 
courts must recognize that Frye has divorced Mack. For Goeb, Doe, and 
MRE 702 to coexist, foundational reliability must be applied to the 
unique characteristics of each expert opinion.317 This foundational 
reliability analysis is detached from any Frye analysis. In Obeta and Doe, 
312. MINN. R. EVID. 702. 
 313. Compare Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 801 N.W.2d 203, 
207–08 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (deeming Frye-Mack the wrong framework for 
evaluating the admissibility of repressed memory evidence), rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150 
(Minn. 2012), with Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 2009 WL 5576242, 
at *25 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009) (excluding repressed memory evidence under 
Frye-Mack as not generally accepted), rev’d, 801 N.W.2d 203, rev’d, 817 N.W.2d 150. 
314. See State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 231 (Minn. 2005) (citing People 
v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 403–04 (Mich. 1990)).
315. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000).
316. See MINN. R. EVID. 702. This does not solve the problem of determining what
evidence is novel and thus subject to general acceptance. This author sees no 
concrete method of remedying this dilemma—any line drawn or definition 
proposed will prove imperfect in practice. Daubert eliminated this problem by 
forming an inclusive and comprehensive standard that works to implicitly exclude 
evidence that Frye would judge not generally accepted. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). However, if Minnesota trial lawyers find 
Frye’s purported benefits to outweigh the detriment posed by the “novel” ambiguity, 
then this may be too limited a problem to warrant change. 
 317. See MINN. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment 
(stating that the required foundation will vary by context). 
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the Minnesota Supreme Court referred to Frye-Mack as the fourth 
part of MRE 702.318 But, it is truly only Frye, not Frye-Mack, that the 
fourth part of MRE 702 describes.319 Clearly, for novel, hard science 
evidence, the foundational reliability inquiry may resemble previous 
Mack applications.320 But, continuing to refer to the standard for all 
MRE 702 evidence as Frye-Mack causes confusion in application 
because MRE 702 includes a separate foundational reliability 
requirement that may differ from Mack and not trigger Frye. 
Finally, appellate courts tasked with Frye questions must give Frye 
answers. While not a proposed rule change, this notion carries great 
importance. Trial courts, correctly or not, commonly rely on 
precedent to determine whether proffered opinions must be 
scrutinized under Frye.321 Appellate courts disservice trial courts by 
not deciding cases on the merits to create this precedent.322 By not 
aiding in this Frye determination, appellate courts fail to foster the 
uniformity and precedent-based aims underlying Minnesota’s 
standard. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At day’s end, judges follow rigid rules rigidly and flexible rules 
flexibly. Frye-Mack represents a rigid test that aims to facilitate 
uniform decisions on complex issues.323 Frye-Mack further intends to 
rid judges of discretion on complicated scientific issues by deferring 
in these issues to the relevant scientific community.324 
To achieve these ends, Frye-Mack requires a consistent and 
concrete standard that trial courts can apply. In Doe v. Archdiocese of 
St. Paul & Minneapolis,325 the court’s analysis underscored several key 
problems with Frye-Mack and created others. By failing to address 
 318. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150, 164–65 
(Minn. 2012); State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 294 (Minn. 2011). 
 319. MINN. R. EVID. 702 (referring in part four to general acceptance, not 
foundational reliability). 
 320. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000) (requiring the 
proponent to establish that “the test itself is reliable and that its administration in 
the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure 
reliability”). 
321. See supra Section III.A.1. 
322. State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d. 91, 108 (Minn. 2010) (Meyer, J., concurring). 
323. See Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 811. 
324. See id. at 815. 
325. 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012). 
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what constitutes novel scientific theory,326 particularly regarding 
issues of social science, the court failed to execute Frye-Mack’s goal of 
uniformity. Also, by applying a factor-based analysis inclusive of 
general acceptance and validity,327 and by merging the foundational 
reliability tests for scientific and non-scientific evidence,328 the Doe 
court moved closer to a Daubert-like analysis. In doing so, the court 
further clouded the role that general acceptance plays in a Frye-Mack 
analysis. 
Frye has clear benefits: it allows judges to defer to scientists on 
complex scientific opinions, it seeks to prevent judges from 
exercising undue discretion in deciding admissibility, and it fosters 
uniformity in decisions if properly applied.329 To reap these benefits, 
Minnesota should consider amending its standard for admitting 
expert testimony by limiting Frye to novel opinions of “hard” science, 
separating Frye from Mack, and encouraging appellate courts to 
provide Frye issues with Frye answers to promote lower court 
uniformity.330 
 326. Id. at 165 (electing not to consider Frye-Mack’s applicability to repressed 
memory evidence). 
327. Id. at 168. 
 328. Id. (deeming Frye-Mack’s reliability test substantially the same as a non-
scientific test under MRE 702). 
329. See Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 813–14. 
330. See supra Part IV. 
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